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LEARNED HAND’S SEVEN OTHER IDEAS ABOUT
THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Vincent Blasi*
I say “other” because, regarding the freedom of speech, Learned Hand has
suffered the not uncommon fate of having his best ideas either drowned out
or credited exclusively to others due to the excessive attention that has been
bestowed on one of his lesser ideas. Sitting as a district judge in the case of
Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten,1 Hand wrote the earliest judicial opinion
about the freedom of speech that has attained canonical status. He ruled that
under the recently passed Espionage Act of 1917,2 writings critical of
government cannot be grounds for imposing criminal punishment or the
denial of mailing privileges unless the authors tell their readers it is in their
interest or is their duty to violate the law.3 Hostile criticism very likely to
cause harm or intended to do so is not punishable under that statute, he
concluded, if it stops short of direct advocacy of law violation.4 He derived
this standard in the guise of statutory interpretation but very little in the text
of the law or its history of passage suggested his reading. Rather, to support
his preferred test Hand drew upon what he took to be the basic
presuppositions of democratic governance, assumed to underlie the
enactment of the statute. In subsequent private correspondence, he repeatedly
invoked his test as not only implicit in the Espionage Act but also the best
interpretation of the First Amendment.5
Hand’s focus on the exact meaning conveyed by the speaker’s words
rather than their likely or intended effect represents a different approach from
that of his peers, most notably his friend and hero Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., whose clear-and-present-danger test, introduced two years later,
turns on predicted consequences and speaker intentions.6 It has become a
* Vincent Blasi is Corliss Lamont Professor of Civil Liberties, Columbia Law School.
1.
244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
2.
Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, § 1, 40 Stat. 217.
3.
Masses Publ’g Co., 244 F. at 540.
4.
Id.
5.
See Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment
Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 758, 763, 765–66, 768, 770 (1975).
6.
See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting);
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
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staple of First Amendment study to examine the limits of the principle of
freedom of speech by comparing the contrasting tests of Holmes and Hand.7
In these comparisons, Hand typically holds his own and the subject is
illuminated, even if this focus on the operational test or standard tends to
divert attention from much else that Hand’s Masses opinion has to offer.
To simplify, Hand’s test has the advantage of making the legally relevant
inquiry a determination of the specific meaning of a discrete communication,
a commission we might think both trial and appellate judges are well suited
to undertake. Speculative judgments about predicted consequences and
speaker intentions are rendered unnecessary, a happy outcome for disputes in
which political passions and prejudices are likely to be in play. Moreover,
Hand’s approach has a categorical quality that serves the objective of giving
unpopular speakers a “safe harbor” of legal immunity: they pretty much know
in advance what they can and cannot say.8 Holmes’s test, in contrast, seems
better to track the legitimate reasons a liberal government might have for
wanting to regulate speech: principally, the prevention of material harm.
Under Hand’s test, a speaker can deliberately cause serious harm and yet
escape legal liability by influencing audiences with carefully worded albeit
incendiary observations that fall short of specific, operational appeals to
interest or duty.
Thus, Holmes’s test comes across as less vulnerable to abuse by speakers
bent on mischief, while Hand’s test seems to be less vulnerable to abuse by
judges and juries bent on scapegoating controversial or strident but probably
inconsequential speakers. The Holmes and Hand approaches to justifying and
demarcating the freedom of speech can be compared—and usually are—with
dominant attention to such practical matters as risks of abuse, problems of
proof, judicial capability, fair notice of legal vulnerability, common
understanding, and fit with standard regulatory motivations.9 But that is to
conduct the comparison on Holmes’s terms. It is to miss much of what Hand
has to say.
What is most notable about the Masses opinion is the way it proceeds from
the premise that a certain kind of speech, what Hand terms “hostile criticism,”
is not just something the country can endure, but rather something the country
must have if political authority is to derive from the consent of the governed,
a requisite of the constitutional regime’s explicit (“We the People”)
7.
See, e.g., HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN
AMERICA 133–34 (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988).
8.
See Gunther, supra note 5, at 726.
9.
See, e.g., Bernard Schwartz, Holmes Versus Hand: Clear and Present Danger or
Advocacy of Unlawful Action?, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 209.
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commitment to popular sovereignty.10 The various elaborations,
qualifications, and implications which Hand develops from that premise
constitute potentially his most important contribution regarding the freedom
of speech. It is a contribution that has been marginalized by Hand’s
misfortune to be cast by subsequent generations as Holmes’s foil, made to
debate on Holmes’s turf, where experience is exalted and both logic and
political theory devalued. My aim here is to enumerate some of Hand’s
neglected ideas—ideas of broader and deeper significance than the question
of which judge identified the more workable or intuitively appealing test for
delimiting the freedom of speech.
FIRST
Hand treats the freedom of speech not as a personal right against the
majority but rather as a procedure essential to constituting a legitimate
majority.
Like Holmes, Hand was a rights skeptic. His constitutional philosophy,
much influenced by his Harvard Law School teacher James Bradley Thayer,11
was centered on the quest to liberate majority rule from special interests and
demagogic influence. As a young New York practicing lawyer, Hand
published an article in the Harvard Law Review savaging the majority
opinion in Lochner v. New York12 for its ungrounded, expansive, antidemocratic invention of an employer’s constitutional right to be free from
legislative limits on working hours and conditions.13 His extravagant
admiration for Holmes was partly a product of the latter’s now legendary
dissent in that case.
Because of their general skepticism regarding the place of rights in a
regime of popular sovereignty, both Hand and Holmes faced a dilemma
during and shortly after World War I when confronted with claims by
dissident speakers that prosecutions under the Espionage Acts of 1917 and
1918 violated the First Amendment. Both judges were appalled by the
zealous persecution of dissenters that wartime passions unleashed, but they

10. Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 539–40 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
11. See GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 50–52 (1994).
12. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
13. See Learned Hand, Due Process of Law and the Eight-Hour Day, 21 HARV. L. REV. 495,
502–04 (1908).
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were committed to a view of rights and the judicial role that constrained their
capacity as judges to confront the injustice.14
Hand’s solution to this dilemma was nothing short of brilliant. He decided
that the foundational principle of majority rule could be served—not
violated—by protecting speakers because freedom of speech is not really a
right against the ruling majority so much as a component of the very process
that defines and enables majority rule. It is a majoritarian procedure, not an
anti-majoritarian individual right. Only consent to government actions and
policies that is generated in the face of hostile criticism is genuinely
authoritative in a regime of popular sovereignty, he concluded. As such, the
principle of freedom of speech operates not only as a constitutional basis for
striking down a speech-restricting statute such as the Espionage Act of 1917
but also as a starting point for interpreting such a statute. So a reading of the
statute should be undertaken with an eye to preserving “that right to criticize
either by temperate reasoning, or by immoderate and indecent invective,
which is normally the privilege of the individual in countries dependent upon
the free expression of opinion as the ultimate source of authority.”15
This felt need to protect essential, authority-conferring free speech led
Hand to embrace, as a matter of creative statutory interpretation in the spirit
of constitutional avoidance, a distinction that he considered to be
fundamental as a matter of basic democratic theory. “[T]he normal
assumption of democratic government,” he asserts in his Masses opinion, is
that “the suppression of hostile criticism does not turn upon the justice of its
substance or the decency and propriety of its temper.”16 Government
evaluations, whether legislative, executive, or judicial, of the substance or
temper of speech cannot determine which utterances are legally permissible.17
However, that does not mean that all speech is beyond the reach of legitimate
regulation. “[T]here has always been a recognized limit to” “the free
utterance of abuse and criticism of the existing law,” Hand notes, “incident
indeed to the existence of any compulsive power of the state itself.”18 This
“recognized limit” formed the basis for the operative standard he read into
the Espionage Act of 1917:
14. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624–30 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting); Masses Publ’g Co., 244 F. at 537–43; see also David S. Bogen, The Free Speech
Metamorphosis of Mr. Justice Holmes, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 97, 141–42 (1982) (explaining that
“a fundamental tenet of Holmes’s creed was that the judge should not impose his personal values
on society”).
15. Masses Publ’g Co., 244 F. at 539.
16. Id. at 540.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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One may not counsel or advise others to violate the law as it stands.
Words are not only the keys of persuasion, but the triggers of action,
and those which have no purport but to counsel the violation of law
cannot by any latitude of interpretation be a part of that public
opinion which is the final source of government in a democratic
state.19

Notice that Hand derives this limit not by means of balancing benefits and
costs within the categories of speech he is considering, nor by invoking the
practical advantages of the line he draws. Rather, he tries to determine which
categories of speech serve an essential function in generating meaningful
consent to the creation of governmental authority.
With characteristic intellectual candor, Hand admitted in subsequent
private correspondence with the noted First Amendment scholar Zechariah
Chafee, Jr., that his preference for a test based on the meaning of the speaker’s
statement rather than the predicted consequences of the utterance or the
objectives of the speaker does not follow ineluctably from his insistence that
the way to understand the freedom of speech is to ask what speech is essential
to creating majoritarian government authority.20 Were it not for predictable
abuses in administration, he told Chafee, “[t]he chance that the State would
lose any valuable opinion by suppressing those whose purpose was to
produce a violation of law, while they kept on the safe side of counselling it,
seems to me much too thin for practical estimate.”21 So the practicalities of
administration and proof did matter to Hand, but only because they have a
bearing on identifying which speech serves the function of facilitating
majority rule.
One could disagree with Hand’s judgment regarding which categories of
speech serve the function of constituting democratic authority and still
believe he was asking the correct question. For example, Dr. Martin Luther
King’s call in his historic Letter From Birmingham Jail for the violation of
demonstrably unjust racial segregation ordinances, to be undertaken openly
in the spirit of peaceful protest and with no effort to evade punishment, would
seem to qualify as the counseling of violation of law but also as hostile
criticism that constitutes a legitimate test for a regime that claims to be based
on popular sovereignty.22 Perhaps under his own theoretical rationale Judge
Hand needed to subdivide and treat differently various calls for the violation
19. Id.
20. See Gunther, supra note 5, at 765.
21. Id. at 766.
22. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter From Birmingham Jail (1963), reprinted in 26 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 835, 837–41 (1993).

722

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

of law, something he failed to do in the Masses opinion. Even were that so,
his underlying theory would not be discredited.
There is reason to believe that Hand’s focus on how democratic authority
is constituted derived from his reading of a book, The Promise of American
Life, written by his good friend and New Hampshire summer neighbor,
Herbert Croly.23 That book, published in 1909, created a buzz among
intellectually-inclined Progressives.24 Hand loved it, spent many hours and
letters discussing it with Croly, and did all he could to get others, including
Theodore Roosevelt, to read it.25 Roosevelt’s third-party Bull Moose
presidential campaign in 1912 drew upon several of Croly’s ideas.26
One thing a twenty-first century reader of the book is bound to find
striking is the degree to which Croly integrates his understanding of the rights
and duties of individual citizens into the quest for a collective democratic
spirit. Much of the book is devoted to unpacking the idea of popular
sovereignty.27 Croly maintains that a certain kind of collective will is integral
to the concept: “The People are not Sovereign as individuals. They are not
Sovereign in reason and morals even when united into a majority. They
become Sovereign only in so far as they succeed in reaching and expressing
a collective purpose.”28
He also recognizes that forging and sustaining such a collective purpose
is an ongoing challenge: “Undesirable and inadequate forms of democracy
always seek to dispense in one way or another with this tedious process of
achieving a morally authoritative Sovereign will.”29 Croly is not as clear as
he needs to be about how a large, diverse population spread out over a
continent can have a collective purpose, but he appears to accord major roles
to trust, fair procedure, national identity, and moral aspiration. He invokes a
duty “of dealing towards one’s fellow-countrymen in good faith, so that

23. Marc Winerman & William E. Kovacic, Learned Hand, Alcoa, and the Reluctant
Application of the Sherman Act, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 295, 312–13 (2013).
24. See David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Progressive Social Thought, 74 TEX. L. REV. 951,
978–79 (1996) (“[The Promise of American Life] was widely praised by . . . progressive
intellectuals . . . .”); see also CHARLES FORCEY, THE CROSSROADS OF LIBERALISM CROLY, WEYL,
LIPPMANN, AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 1900–1925, at 121 (1961) (“[The Promise of American
Life was] a significant part of the progressive movement.”).
25. See GUNTHER, supra note 11, at 195–97.
26. Id. at 190–202.
27. See HERBERT CROLY, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LIFE 84–86, 176–78, 223–24, 265–
66, 269–70, 279–81 (1965).
28. Id. at 280.
29. Id. at 281.
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differences of interest, of conviction, and of moral purpose can be made the
agency of a better understanding and a firmer loyalty.”30
More than biographical details about their friendship suggests that Hand
was influenced by Croly. In an article he published in the Harvard Law
Review the year before he wrote the Masses opinion (and seven years after he
read and touted The Promise of American Life), Hand discussed with
unmistakably Crolyesque resonance how law relates to collective will:
The law must have an authority supreme over the will of the
individual, and such an authority can arise only from a background
of social acquiescence, which gives it the voice of indefinitely
greater numbers than those of its expositors. Thus, the law surpasses
the deliverances of even the most exalted of its prophets; the
momentum of its composite will alone makes it effective to coerce
the individual and reconciles him to his subserviency.31

Because law is at bottom a manifestation of the collective will, “it must be
content to lag behind the best inspiration of its time until it feels behind it the
weight of such general acceptance as will give sanction to its pretension to
unquestioned dictation.”32
Nevertheless,
It is not as the priests of a completed revelation that the living
successors of past lawmakers can most truly show their reverence
or continue the traditions which they affect to regard. . . . Only as
an articulate organ of the half-understood aspirations of living men,
constantly recasting and adapting existing forms, bringing to the
high light of expression the dumb impulses of the present, can they
continue in the course of the ancestors whom they revere.33

Legal interpretation must be dynamic as well as disciplined and deferential
because
no human purpose possesses itself so completely in advance as to
admit of final definition. Life overflows its moulds and the will
outstrips its own universals. Men cannot know their own meaning
till the variety of its manifestations is disclosed in its final impacts,
and the full content of no design is grasped till it has got beyond its

30. Id. at 286. See DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 232–42
(1997), for a lucid account of how Croly’s understanding of popular sovereignty bears on the
freedom of speech.
31. Learned Hand, The Speech of Justice, 29 HARV. L. REV. 617, 618 (1916).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 618–19.
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general formulation and become differentiated in its last
incidence.34

Hand might as well have entitled his article “The Promise of American Law.”
Perhaps Judge Hand’s most revealing explanation for why he valued the
freedom of speech mainly for its contribution to the enrichment of collective
opinion appears in brief remarks he made in 1944, two weeks prior to D-Day,
upon administering the oath of citizenship to 150,000 newly-naturalized
immigrants gathered in Central Park.35 With over a million of their fellow
citizens in attendance,36 Hand told the new Americans:
Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no
constitution, no law, no court can save it; no constitution, no law,
no court can even do much to help it. While it lies there, it needs no
constitution, no law, no court to save it.37

Because liberty, like law, lies in public sentiment rather than formal
enactments, claimants and defenders of liberty must attend more than
anything else to how public opinion is formed.
SECOND
He derives his understanding of the relationship between free speech and
the creation of legitimate government authority from the common
assumptions of regimes that are founded on the principle of popular
sovereignty.
In Masses Hand invokes authority in defense of his theory but it is not the
authority of judicial precedent, or a particular law-creating action, or the
intentions of specific lawgivers, or what may have been the common
understanding of his own political community at a particular moment in time.
Rather, he invokes the authority of what is “normally” guaranteed in
“countries dependent upon the free expression of opinion as the ultimate
source of authority.”38 Or again, he rests his case on the authority of “the
normal assumption of democratic government” and what “in normal times is
a safeguard of free government.”39 In effect, his argument is that the
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 620.
GUNTHER, supra note 11, at 548.
See id.
LEARNED HAND, The Spirit of Liberty, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS
ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 189, 190 (Irving Dilliard ed., 2d ed. 1953).
38. Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
39. Id. at 540.
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Espionage Act of 1917 and, as his subsequent correspondence makes clear
even the First Amendment itself, should be interpreted with reference to what
are the requisites of the general form of government to which the nation is
committed.40 In the case of the United States, that is an electoral republic of
limited powers based on the principle of popular sovereignty. This
understanding of the kind of authority that matters most enables Hand and
those who would follow him to debate controversial questions of
interpretation with a focus on vital functions, objectives, structures, and
relationships, that is, features relating to the ongoing distribution of power
and trust that go to the heart of whether a government should be considered
a republic, with all that term implies about political responsiveness, energy,
adaptation, and resilience. Notably missing from Hand’s Masses opinion are
appeals to free-standing textual language or precedent.
It is interesting that with the help of a skillful lawyer in the Masses case,
Gilbert Roe, Hand may have derived his understanding of the proper sources
of authority from James Madison, the principal author of the First
Amendment. Roe was the attorney who initiated the Masses litigation on
behalf of the magazine, seeking to enjoin the New York Postmaster’s denial
of mailing privileges for the August 1917 issue.41 Earlier that year Roe had
testified before Congress in opposition to passage of the Espionage Act.42 In
his testimony, he analogized the proposed law to the infamous Sedition Act
of 1798.43 He called attention to James Madison’s detailed contention in his
Virginia Report of 1800 that the Sedition Act violated the First Amendment.44
Available records do not tell us what arguments Roe made to Judge Hand in
the District Court, but in defending Hand’s ruling in Masses before the
Second Circuit, Roe’s brief placed heavy emphasis on Madison’s argument

40. See Gunther, supra note 5, at 725–26, 765–66 (quoting Letter from Learned Hand,
Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of N.Y., to Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Professor, Harvard Law
Sch. (Jan. 8, 1920)).
41. Masses Publ’g Co., 244 F. at 537.
42. Espionage and Inference with Neutrality: Hearings on H.R. 291 Before H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 65th Cong. 36–42, 62–63 (1917) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Gilbert E.
Roe, Esq., Representative, The Free Speech League).
43. Id. For an account of Roe’s testimony by his biographer, see ERIC B. EASTON,
DEFENDING THE MASSES: A PROGRESSIVE LAWYER’S BATTLES FOR FREE SPEECH 128 (2017).
Regarding Roe’s testimony analogizing the Espionage Act to the Sedition Act of 1798, which
provoked Madison’s Virginia Report, see Geoffrey R. Stone, Judge Learned Hand and the
Espionage Act of 1917: A Mystery Unraveled, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 335, 351 (2003).
44. Compare Hearings, supra note 42, at 36–42, with JAMES MADISON, REPORT ON THE
ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS (1800), reprinted in WRITINGS 608 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999).
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in the Virginia Report.45 Two years later, when the Espionage Act of 1917
was under review before the United States Supreme Court in the case of Debs
v. United States, Roe submitted an amicus brief which invoked Madison in
similar fashion to challenge the constitutionality of the Act.46
If Roe did indeed construct his argument before Judge Hand the same way
he tried to persuade Congress, the Second Circuit, and the Supreme Court
that punishing explicit, strongly worded war criticism violates a proper
understanding of the freedom of speech, it is not surprising that in his Masses
opinion Hand would make his main source of interpretative authority the
national constitutional commitment to the republican form of government
founded on the principle of popular sovereignty. For that is exactly what
Madison did in his Virginia Report, so heavily emphasized in all of Roe’s
various challenges to the Espionage Act.47
Madison famously, if not always consistently, maintained that
interpretation of the Constitution should be based on the understanding of its
provisions that prevailed at the state ratification conventions whose assent
made the Constitution positive law, or the state legislatures whose
ratifications of subsequent amendments gave those provisions constitutional
status.48 In that regard, the intentions of drafters of constitutional clauses or
amendments (such as Madison himself) were legally relevant, he thought,
only insofar as they informed the understandings of the ratifiers.49 Staying
true to the ratifiers is not a simple interpretative undertaking, however, given
the paucity of records regarding the deliberations of the ratifying bodies, not
to mention the difficulty as a general matter of determining such a thing as
the collective understanding of a multi-member body, particularly about
contentious questions considered by all the actors to be historically
consequential. Madison appreciated the limits of textual content as a window
into enactor will better than most; his Federalist No. 37 is a succinct
disquisition on the subject.50 So it is instructive to track how he went about in
the Virginia Report to argue that the Sedition Act of 1798 violated the First

45. See generally Brief of Complainant-Appellee, Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24
(2d Cir. 1917) (No. 123).
46. See generally Brief of Gilbert E. Roe as Amicus Curiae, Debs v. United States, 249 U.S.
211 (1919) (No. 714).
47. See MADISON, supra note 44, at 644–58.
48. For a careful account of how in different constitutional controversies Madison treated
this question of whose understanding is authoritative, see JEREMY D. BAILEY, JAMES MADISON
AND CONSTITUTIONAL IMPERFECTION 150–59 (2015).
49. See id. at 151.
50. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison).

50:0717]

LEARNED HAND’S SEVEN OTHER IDEAS

727

Amendment, and how much his interpretative method has in common with
Judge Hand’s in the Masses case.51
Madison begins his argument by asserting that the “freedom of the press”
specified in the First Amendment cannot have been understood by the
ratifiers to be coextensive with the English common law concept of press
freedom.52 This is because, unlike in Britain, in the United States “[t]he
people, not the government, possess the absolute sovereignty.”53 A free press
serves an entirely different function in the American republic from what it
does in Britain, where both the crown and one branch of the legislature are
hereditary rather than elective and “the danger of encroachments on the rights
of the people is understood to be confined to the executive magistrate.”54
Indeed, in Britain “[t]he representatives of the people in the legislature, are
not only exempt themselves, from distrust, but are considered as sufficient
guardians of the rights of their constituents against the danger from the
executive.”55 In the United States, by contrast, “the executive magistrates are
not held to be infallible, nor the legislatures to be omnipotent; and both, being
elective, are both responsible.”56 These fundamental differences between the
two regimes (one of which did not qualify as a republic by his measure) in
sovereignty, trust, and accountability led Madison to ask, rhetorically: “Is it
not natural and necessary, under such different circumstances, that a different
degree of freedom, in the use of the press, should be contemplated?”57
Then, after sketching the political pressures and deliberations that led to
the decision to amend the Constitution by adding a Bill of Rights including
the First Amendment, Madison makes the following intriguing observation
about the proper sources of authority:
But the question does not turn either on the wisdom of the
Constitution or on the policy which gave rise to its particular
organization. It turns on the actual meaning of the instrument; by
which it has appeared, that a power over the press is clearly
excluded, from the number of powers delegated to the federal
government.58

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

MADISON, supra note 44, at 608–662.
MADISON, supra note 44, at 644.
Id. at 645.
Id. at 645–46.
Id. at 645.
Id. at 646.
Id.
Id. at 651.
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Some interpreters might think that the history, both outdoors and indoors, of
adoption might be a key to discerning “actual meaning,” but Madison quickly
makes clear that for him actual meaning is to be found in the structure of
accountability manifested in the document.
We know this in part by the way he describes the rights and—
importantly—the duties that are “secured”59 (not created) by the First
Amendment. He accords equal status in his analysis to “the freedom of the
press,”60 “th[e] right of freely examining public characters and measures, and
of . . . communication . . . thereon,”61 and “the right of electing the members
of the government,”62 despite the fact that only the first right appears in the
text of the Amendment. He never discusses the meaning of “the freedom of
speech.” Furthermore, his framing the interpretative inquiry in terms of
delegated and reserved powers signals Madison’s premise that for him the
First Amendment is principally about popular sovereignty and limited,
accountable government, not free-standing rights as such. It is about the
functioning of republican government. Consequently, it is to be interpreted,
he strongly implies, by determining which understandings of rights and duties
are most consonant with the premises, procedures, and objectives of
republican government. His search for “actual meaning” centers on the effort
to understand the structures, relationships, responsibilities, and purposes
enacted by the constitutional text.
Madison next sets out in the Virginia Report how the Constitution itself,
including as amended in 1791, assumes that the officers of government “may
not discharge their trusts,” that when that happens “they should be brought
into contempt or disrepute,” that such an accountability generates “the duty
as well as the right of intelligent and faithful citizens” to control miscreant
officials “by the censorship of the public opinion,” so as to “promote a
remedy according to the rules of the Constitution,” to which end free
elections serve as chief among “the great remedial rights of the people.”63 He
elaborates:
[T]he right of electing the members of the government, constitutes
more particularly the essence of a free and responsible government.
The value and efficacy of this right, depends on the knowledge of
the . . . merits and demerits of the candidates for public trust; and

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 657–58.
Id. at 658.
Id. at 651–52, 654.
Id. at 655.
Id. at 652–53.
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on the equal freedom, consequently, of examining and discussing
these merits and demerits . . . respectively.64

Madison believed in natural rights and based his constitutional
understanding upon their existence,65 in that respect differing mightily from
Hand.66 In matters of legal interpretation, Madison may also have accorded
more significance to formal enactment in preference to organic development
than did Hand, the quintessential common law judge.67 Nevertheless, it is
striking how much Hand’s analysis in Masses replicates Madison’s method
of reasoning from the commitment to popular sovereignty in its republican
form to establish the centrality of public opinion in the constitutional scheme.
Like Madison, Hand does that specifically to determine what opportunities
citizens must have to scrutinize and criticize their governors. Whether or not
he was influenced by actually having read the Virginia Report, Hand’s
employment of an interpretative method not unlike Madison’s is a
noteworthy feature of the Masses opinion.
THIRD
He concludes from republican theory that the most problematic kind of
regulation of speech is that which turns on the viewpoint expressed by the
speaker.
In the Masses opinion, Hand does not elaborate upon the popular
sovereignty theory he invokes. But in a fascinating letter he wrote to
Professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr. twenty-nine months later, he supplemented
his analysis in a way that anticipated the eventual course of modern First
Amendment doctrine, particularly the singling out of “viewpoint
discrimination” as the quintessential regulatory wrong:
64.
65.

Id. at 655.
See LANCE BANNING, THE SACRED FIRE OF LIBERTY: JAMES MADISON & THE FOUNDING
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 92–93 (1998); COLLEEN A. SHEEHAN, JAMES MADISON AND THE SPIRIT
OF REPUBLICAN SELF-GOVERNMENT 83 (2009); Jack N. Rakove, The Madisonian Theory of
Rights, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 245 (1990).
66. In a letter to Zechariah Chafee, Hand colorfully expressed his deflationary view of rights
as serving procedural efficiency rather than fundamental entitlement. See Gunther, supra note 5,
at 769–71 (quoting Letter from Learned Hand, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of N.Y., to
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Professor, Harvard Law Sch. (Jan. 2, 1921)) (“On the whole I believe that
while the justification for freedom of speech is public enlightenment, historically the ‘right,’—
though I join you in hating the word,—is vested in the speaker constitutionally, and our
legislatures can engage ad lib. in obscurantism, provided they don’t infringe on an individual who
can cry out.”).
67. Admittedly, it is inevitably a stretch to compare the jurisprudential commitments of a
person operating in an incipient legal regime with another operating in a mature one.
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[A]ny state which professes to be controlled by public opinion,
cannot take sides against any opinion except that which must
express itself in the violation of law. On the contrary, it must regard
all other expressions of opinion as tolerable, if not good. As soon as
it does not, it inevitably assumes that one opinion may control in
spite of what might become an opposite opinion. It becomes a State
based upon some opinion, as against any opinion which may get
itself accepted. . . .
If so, nothing short of counsel to violate law should be itself
illegal.68

Although Hand has never received credit for introducing possibly both the
earliest and the best defense of the now-dominant principle against viewpoint
discrimination, no doubt in large part because his defense surfaced only in
private correspondence, his justification is notable for its powerful theoretical
grounding. The great weight that current doctrine accords to whether the
applicability of a regulation of speech or its justification turns on the
viewpoint advanced by the speaker usually is explained in terms of possible
distortion of public debate or possible revelation of an illicit regulatory
purpose. Many years ago Geoffrey Stone developed these rationales and they
have figured prominently in academic inquiry ever since.69 Recently, James
Weinstein has suggested that government discrimination on the basis of
viewpoint fails to accord individual speakers the equal dignity and respect to
which they are entitled, either as persons or more narrowly as citizens.70
Hand’s rationale for the principle against viewpoint discrimination has
certain advantages over those proffered by Stone and his many followers or
Weinstein. Their explanations depend to a considerable extent on claims
regarding either what amounts to a “distortion” of public debate, or how illicit
purpose can be inferred from the form a regulation takes, or what it means to
treat persons equally. All of these are worthy inquiries in evaluating the
exercise of state power, but they are questions that are likely to engender a
wide range of answers. Hand’s rationale depends on a claim that will seem to
many less disputable. His premise is that popular sovereignty embodied in
the republican form of government requires, above all else, that the exercise
68. See Gunther, supra note 5, at 765 (quoting Letter from Learned Hand, Judge, U.S. Dist.
Court for the S. Dist. of N.Y., to Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Professor, Harvard Law Sch. (Jan. 8,
1920)).
69. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 189, 198, 227 (1983); see also Leslie Kendrick, Content Discrimination Revisited, 98 VA.
L. REV. 231, 248 (2012).
70. James Weinstein, Hate Speech Bans, Democracy, and Political Legitimacy, 32 CONST.
COMMENT. 527, 580 (2017).
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of government authority be responsive to public opinion, if not reflexively
and rapidly in response to shocks and fevers, at least in due course and
continually.71 Viewpoint discrimination is problematic, according to Hand,
because it contravenes the republican commitment that law and policy, like
human understanding, be open-ended, capable of adapting to changing
conditions.72
Arguably the most consequential issue of First Amendment interpretation
currently is whether the principle against viewpoint discrimination should be
extended to create a strong presumption against forms of regulation that take
into account the subject matter of the speech (e.g., for whom to vote, what to
buy, where to go to attend an event), the legal status of the speaker (e.g.,
foreign national, economic entity, civil servant, prisoner, non-adult), or the
function served by the speech (e.g., persuasion, transmission of information,
intimidation, signaling solidarity, teaching a skill). The omnibus term
“content regulation” typically is employed to encompass this set of disparate
variables. Taking into account subject matter, speaker identity, or speech
function surely can be a means of practicing viewpoint discrimination
surreptitiously. But often those variables are treated as relevant for legitimate
reasons that have little to do with viewpoint discrimination. Consider labeling
requirements, libel law, and punishment for fraud. Hand’s distinctive
justification for the principle against viewpoint discrimination has
implications for whether viewpoint regulation should be conflated with
content regulation in the formulation of First Amendment doctrine as a
general matter, or only upon proof or good reason to suspect that in the
particular instance considering content was a cover for punishing viewpoint.73
Compared with the other rationales for treating viewpoint discrimination
to be the quintessential violation of the First Amendment, Hand’s
justification based on the conceptual impossibility of a republic being “a State
based upon some opinion” provides less reason to lump viewpoint and
content regulation together. In terms of conceptual coherence, it is not the
case that a republic the laws of which make relevant the subject matter or
71. See Gunther, supra note 5, at 765. In recent years, Dean Post has emphasized this type
of responsiveness as a defining dimension of popular sovereignty, tracing the idea to Madison.
See, e.g., ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE
CONSTITUTION 10–11 (2014); see also Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech,
97 VA. L. REV. 477, 482 (2011).
72. See Gunther, supra note 5, at 765.
73. This precise question is debated in an exchange between Justice Thomas, for the
majority, and Justice Kagan, concurring, in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). For
a comprehensive analysis of that debate and its doctrinal implications see Genevieve Lakier, Reed
v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona, and the Rise of the Anticlassificatory First Amendment, 2016 SUP.
CT. REV. 233.
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function of a communication or the status of the speaker thereby becomes
founded upon “some opinion.” True, if in a particular instance those nonviewpoint considerations are used to select for viewpoint under the table, the
conceptual difficulty invoked by Hand kicks in. The State then is indeed
basing its exercise of authority “upon some opinion, as against any opinion
which may get itself accepted.” But if the principal function of the freedom
of speech is to legitimate and facilitate majority rule, as Hand maintained, it
would raise a different kind of conceptual problem to leverage this occasional
phenomenon of surreptitious viewpoint discrimination into a wholesale
prohibition against regulators employing coverage criteria relating to subject
matter, speaker identity, or speech function. Such criteria routinely have been
utilized by republican regimes to make their laws closely track their policy
justifications and operate no more broadly or intrusively than necessary. Both
dimensions of fit, we might think, are defining features of limited,
accountable government. In this respect, Hand’s distinctive understanding of
the freedom of speech as conceptually integrated with the project of
republican governance has implications for how large the footprint of the
First Amendment can be without contradicting its own raison d’etre.
Of course, the test that Hand derived from his republican premise has an
honored place for one kind of viewpoint discrimination, punishment of a
speaker for telling his audience that it is in their interest or is their duty to
violate the law.74 Why this exception to what is asserted to be a fundamental
general principle? Did Hand simply find it necessary to identify some
category of speech which is punishable so as not to appear “absolutist” in a
doctrinaire sort of way? That explanation is implausible not only because
Hand had the courage of his convictions, but also because even if he had felt
some need to find limits to speaker freedom nothing in his analysis forced
him to employ viewpoint in preference to other possible sources of limitation.
I believe that Hand derived his exception from the same foundational
commitment from which he derived his general disallowance of viewpoint
discrimination: popular sovereignty. Just as popular sovereignty embodies
the authority of emergent, nascent, and potential majorities, it embodies the
authority of currently prevailing majorities. This last type of majority must
not entrench itself but must be allowed to rule, and that allowance entails a
minimum respect for the authority of law on the part of all those who aspire
to rule in the future by altering public opinion and gaining political control.
Stirring up fierce discontent with existing rulers, policies, and practices is
consistent with such respect for the authority of law, but telling persons it is
in their interest or is their duty to violate the law as it currently stands is not.
74.

See Gunther, supra note 5, at 721.
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Or so an adherent to Hand’s understanding of dynamic popular sovereignty
in a republic might believe.
In fact, Hand’s exception to his general disallowance of viewpoint
discrimination echoes a distinction Herbert Croly drew in The Promise of
American Life.75 A nation’s sovereign will, according to Croly, “increases
with the increasing power of its citizens to deal fairly and to feel loyally
towards their fellow-countrymen.”76 Although the “responsibility and loyalty
which the citizens of a democratic nation must feel towards one another is
comprehensive and unmitigable,” particular laws “will be welcome to some
citizens and obnoxious to others.”77 Those in the latter category “have every
right and should be permitted every opportunity to protest in the most
vigorous and persistent manner.”78 This is how the bond essential to having a
collective sovereign will is preserved in the face of conflicting interests and
opinions. But the bond, according to Croly, is a two-way street: “The nation
may, however, on its part demand that these protests, in order to be heeded
and respected, must conform to certain conditions. They must not be carried
to the point of refusing obedience to the law.”79
Croly does not say in so many words that protests must not be carried to
the point of advocating as well as practicing disobedience to law, but his
argument from reciprocity would support such an extension. And Judge Hand
may well have found this part of a book he knew well to be of interest,
especially because its author was so focused on trying to understand and
unpack the concept of popular sovereignty.
FOURTH
He does not require that speech meet a standard of decorum or
reasonableness in order to be protected.
Croly found that the commitment to popular sovereignty entails a right of
dissenters to “protest in the most vigorous and persistent manner” consistent
with the correlative duty to obey the laws in place until they are altered by
democratic means.80 Hand outdid Croly in validating aggressive dissent. The
Masses opinion explicitly extends its protection to “immoderate and indecent

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

See CROLY, supra note 27, at 280–88.
Id. at 285.
Id.
Id. at 285–86.
Id. at 286.
Id.
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invective,”81 arguments “trivial in substance, and violent and perverse in
manner,”82 “intemperate and inflammatory public discussion,”83 “hostile
criticism” which falls outside “the range of temperate argument,”84 “free
utterance of abuse and criticism,”85 the arousal of “passions” by means of
“[p]olitical agitation,”86 and the writings of a magazine “which attacks with
the utmost violence the draft and the war.”87
Were Hand elaborating a free-standing individual right grounded in a
conception of inviolable personhood, the freedom to express hostility in an
intemperate, indecent, abusive manner might seem to be implied. But why
should the freedom of speech understood as a procedure for facilitating
popular sovereignty in a collective and constructive sense extend to the kind
of hostile, inflammatory agitation that Hand goes out of his way almost to
celebrate in Masses?
James Madison confronted this very question when he developed in the
Virginia Report the argument that the commitment to popular sovereignty
entails the protection of speech critical of public characters and measures. In
response to the argument of defenders of the Sedition Act of 1798 that it only
punished malicious writings published with the intent to defame officials,
bring them into contempt or disrepute, or excite hatred against them, Madison
said:
Should it happen, as the [C]onstitution supposes it may happen, that
either of these branches of the government, may not have duly
discharged its trust; it is natural and proper, that according to the
cause and degree of their faults, they should be brought into
contempt or disrepute, and incur the hatred of the people.88

As discussed above, Hand may or may not have been urged by counsel in
Masses to consult the Virginia Report, but whatever the truth of the matter is
on that point, it is noteworthy that even a thinker so concerned about the
quality of public debate as Madison should have seen a constructive role for
angry, disrespectful speech in the forging of a sovereign public opinion.
John Stuart Mill also addressed the question of how decorum figures in
the freedom of speech. In On Liberty, published in 1859, Mill expressed the
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 539–40.
Id. at 540.
Id.
Id. at 541.
See MADISON, supra note 44, at 652.
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view that in principle the maintenance of high standards of fairness and
rationality in public debate would advance the search for progress in wideranging understanding.89 (Such progress was his priority; Mill was not
exploring the sources of political authority.) But then he explained how
demands for discursive decency play out in practice:
With regard to what is commonly meant by intemperate discussion,
namely invective, sarcasm, personality, and the like, the
denunciation of these weapons would deserve more sympathy if it
were ever proposed to interdict them equally to both sides; but it is
only desired to restrain the employment of them against the
prevailing opinion . . . .90

When those who defend prevailing opinions resort to “unmeasured
vituperation” against their opponents, they are greeted not with sanctions or
criticism but rather “the praise of honest zeal and righteous indignation.”91
This pattern of selective insistence on temperate argument led Mill to
conclude that “law and authority have no business” enforcing a decorum of
public disputation.92 Mill’s point about imbalance and prejudice in
administration would seem to have even more purchase in Hand’s political
process justification for the freedom of speech than it does in Mill’s
justification based on general enlightenment and societal progress.
In the Masses opinion, Hand’s pattern throughout is to mention the
impropriety of any kind of decorum requirement virtually every time he
describes the freedom at issue. That indicates how strongly he was committed
to the proposition. However, he never explains in the least detail the basis for
this view. He does say explicitly in Masses that the legal standard cannot
properly embody a demand for a “general tenor and animus” or a “general
ethos” because “[t]he tradition of English-speaking freedom has depended in
no small part upon the merely procedural requirement that the state point with
exactness to just that conduct which violates the law.”93 It is hard to imagine
a decorum standard that could meet this requirement. If this concern best
explains Hand’s rejection of decorum as a limiting principle in free speech
disputes, the Masses opinion anticipates Justice John Marshall Harlan’s
memorable dictum in Cohen v. California, affirming the right to use fourletter words in public: “it is largely because governmental officials cannot
89.
(1859).
90.
91.
92.
93.

See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 118 (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., 2003)
Id. at 119.
Id.
Id.
Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 542–43 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
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make principled distinctions in this area that the Constitution leaves matters
of taste and style so largely to the individual.”94
FIFTH
He assumes that sedition is never a legitimate ground for regulating speech.
Hand says in Masses that a finding that a magazine’s writing is
“subversive to authority and seditious in effect” does not constitute a
sufficient basis for denying it mailing privileges.95 Earlier in the opinion he
maintains that his creative reading of the Espionage Act of 1917 is necessary
to prevent the statute from providing that “every political agitation which can
be shown to . . . create a seditious temper is illegal.”96 In a different paragraph
he specifies that statements which “arouse a seditious disposition” without
directly advocating law violation “would not be enough” to justify
punishment.97 In these three different passages rejecting sedition as a
regulatory rationale, Hand can be read to anticipate the Supreme Court’s
landmark opinion in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan declaring “the central
meaning of the First Amendment” to be the rejection of the very concept of
seditious libel.98
The Sullivan case held that under the First Amendment speakers cannot
be held liable for defaming public figures unless their factual errors are in
effect deliberate.99 That ruling transformed libel law, but as Professor Harry
Kalven, Jr. explained in an article that has become a classic, the Court’s
reasoning was even more dramatic than its holding:
The Court did not simply, in the face of an awkward history,
definitively put to rest the status of the Sedition Act. More
important, it found in the controversy over seditious libel the clue
to “the central meaning of the First Amendment.” The choice of
language was unusually apt. The Amendment has a “central
meaning”—a core of protection of speech without which
democracy cannot function, without which, in Madison’s phrase,
“the censorial power” would be in the Government over the people
and not “in the people over the Government.” This is not the whole
meaning of the Amendment. There are other freedoms protected by
it. But at the center there is no doubt what speech is being protected
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
Masses Publ’g Co., 244 F. at 543.
Id. at 540.
Id. at 542.
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964).
Id. at 279–80.
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and no doubt why it is being protected. The theory of the freedom
of speech clause was put right side up for the first time.100

Justice William Brennan’s majority opinion in Sullivan quoted heavily
from Madison’s Virginia Report, as did Professor Herbert Wechsler’s brief
on behalf of the New York Times.101 Today, for a court to invoke Madison in
a First Amendment case is hardly noteworthy.102 But at the time of the Masses
decision, Madison was pretty much forgotten as an authority about the
freedoms of speech and press. Throughout the nineteenth century, the
Virginia Report was utilized in debates over state sovereignty and
nullification, but its discussion of the First Amendment was all but ignored.
Then came Gilbert Roe.
I had occasion to ask Professor Wechsler, who for several years was my
colleague on the Columbia Law faculty, whether in preparing his historic
brief in the Sullivan case he was aware of the way Gilbert Roe had resurrected
Madison’s Virginia Report in arguing against the Espionage Act of 1917 in
the Masses and Debs cases. He was.
By no means does Judge Hand deserve the credit that Gilbert Roe, Herbert
Wechsler, and Justice William Brennan (or for that matter, Harry Kalven) do
in the saga that led to the fundamental rejection of seditious libel as an
American legal concept. In the Masses opinion, Hand’s treatment of the
modern status of seditious libel occurs only in passing and only in the form
of an unexplained assumption. But Hand is part of the story in that he was the
first judge to do even that much, and he proved to be on the right side of
history.
SIXTH
He formulates a governing test with emphasis on how well it will function
during periods of unusual public anxiety when toleration is at a low ebb
and dissenters are most vulnerable to being made scapegoats.
In the same letter to Zechariah Chafee in which Hand maintained that
viewpoint regulation is problematic because it is a premise of republican
government that a state cannot be “based upon some opinion, as against any
opinion which may get itself accepted,” he observed that it is mainly in “times
of excitement” when fear and prejudice are at their peak that “the freedom of
100. Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central Meaning of the
First Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 208.
101. Brief for the Petitioner at 45, 47, N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1994) (No.
39), 1963 WL 66441.
102. E.g., Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 641 (1972).
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speech becomes important as an institution.”103 He told Chafee that his
preference for a qualitative test extending absolute protection to all advocacy
that stops short of asserting a duty or interest to violate the law was driven by
his skepticism about how a more flexible test requiring judgment, prediction,
or inference would be administered in periods of unusual public anxiety.104 In
a subsequent letter to Chafee he elaborated:
I own I should prefer a qualitative formula, hard, conventional,
difficult to evade. If it could become sacred by the incrustations of
time and precedent it might be made to serve just a little to withhold
the torrents of passion to which I suspect democracies will be found
more subject than for example the whig autocracy of the 18th
century.105

In Hand’s earlier correspondence with Holmes, this theme surfaced as
well. Hand spoke of the need to “moderate the storms of popular feeling”106
and “get over the existing hysteria.”107 He lamented to Holmes that “the merry
sport of Red-baiting goes on, and the pack gives tongue more and more
shrilly.”108 He owned “to a sense of dismay at the increase in all the symptoms
of apparent panic.”109
Hand’s priority he made clear. It is in these unusual periods—periods I
have elsewhere labeled “pathological”110—that the freedom of speech matters
most. But what exactly does that imply about how the First Amendment and
other pertinent laws should be interpreted? In Masses and in his
correspondence and academic writing during the World War I period, Hand
suggested a few answers to this question.
103. See Gunther, supra note 5, at 765–66 (quoting Letter from Learned Hand, Judge, U.S.
Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of N.Y., to Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Professor, Harvard Law Sch. (Jan.
8, 1920)).
104. Id. at 766.
105. Id. at 770 (quoting Letter from Learned Hand, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of
N.Y., to Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Professor, Harvard Law Sch. (Jan. 2, 1921)).
106. Id. at 759 (quoting Letter from Learned Hand, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of
N.Y., to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S. (Apr. 1, 1919)).
107. Id. at 760 (quoting Letter from Learned Hand, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of
N.Y., to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S. (Nov. 25, 1919)).
108. Id. at 761 (quoting Letter from Learned Hand, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of
N.Y., to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S. (Nov. 25, 1919)).
109. Id.
110. See Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 449, 449–50 (1985) (stating that “pathological period” refers to “equip[ping] the first
amendment to do maximum service in those historical periods when intolerance of unorthodox
ideas is most prevalent and when governments are most able and most likely to stifle dissent
systematically”).
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One way for law to push against dangerous, fear-driven, hopefully passing
passions is for doctrinal formulations to reduce as much as is practically
possible the role of discretion, judgment, and prediction in the application of
laws to particular parties. That is exactly what Hand tried to do with his
Masses test. In free speech disputes since then, courts for the most part seem
to have taken his point by opting to employ somewhat crude, formalistic, allencompassing doctrinal concepts such as content discrimination and prior
restraint, partly it would appear in order to make adjudication relatively
mechanical.
Reducing judicial discretion by means of doctrinal formalism might prove
to be efficacious to a degree, but recall that Hand believed firmly that “liberty
lies in the hearts of men and women” rather than in legal prescription or
doctrine.111 This might suggest that the educative role of the First Amendment
ought to be emphasized. When Madison managed to overcome his skepticism
about the efficacy of bills of rights, which he termed “parchment barriers,”112
one of his rationales was that a listing of rights could have a salutary effect
by influencing public opinion or providing a standard around which ordinary
citizens could rally in moments of official transgression.113
How can the freedom of speech be made more educational? One way is
by having articulate, inspiring expositors on the order of Holmes,114 Louis
Brandeis,115 and Justice Robert Jackson.116 Another is by construing it so as
to keep doctrinal formulations resonant with the most noble purposes and
instructive object lessons that over the years gave rise to its pre-eminence
among the various claims of liberty. In this respect, functional rather than
formalistic criteria for determining the scope and meaning of the freedom of
speech would seem to be indicated. The ways that both Hand and Madison
read the First Amendment to be integral to the project of realizing and
sustaining republican government is an example.
However, functional analysis requires sophisticated understanding and
wise judgment. In the wrong hands, sophisticated understanding can produce
complicated doctrinal formulations—creative extensions of coverage, multifactor tests, differential levels of scrutiny—that mask partisan motivations,
enable discriminatory application, and prove counter-productive
educationally. It is the challenge for wise judgment to distill an appreciation
111. HAND, supra note 37, at 190.
112. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in WRITINGS,
supra note 44, at 420.
113. See id. at 421–23.
114. See, e.g., United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 653–55 (1929) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624–31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
115. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372–80 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
116. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 625–42 (1943).
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of functional complexity into operational principles and standards that are
intelligible, intuitively just, and also relatively prescriptive so as to cabin
discretion in application. Equipping the freedom of speech to do service in
the worst of times is a worthy but also challenging undertaking, as Judge
Hand appreciated as well as anyone. His Masses opinion, both the test and
the rationale, was a start, but only that.
SEVENTH
He acknowledges that serious harms might follow from the speech he
nevertheless rules cannot be prohibited.
Possibly influenced by John Stuart Mill’s famous thesis in On Liberty that
only harm can justify restricting individual freedom, reinforced by the
ascendency in First Amendment law of Holmes’s clear and present danger
test, the common tendency has been to justify the protection of free speech
by minimizing the harm that it causes or contending that the harm can be
mitigated or undone by “more speech.”117 This is the sticks-and-stones theory
of the First Amendment.118
Describing the strident writings and satirical cartoons at issue in the case,
Hand in Masses goes out of his way to eschew this rationale:
[P]ublications of this kind enervate public feeling at home which is
their chief purpose, and encourage the success of the enemies of the
United States abroad, to which they are generally indifferent.
Dissension within a country is a high source of comfort and
assistance to its enemies; the least intimation of it they seize upon
with jubilation. There cannot be the slightest question of the
mischievous effects of such agitation upon the success of the
national project . . . .
....
The defendant’s position is that to arouse discontent and
disaffection among the people with the prosecution of the war and
with the draft tends to promote a mutinous and insubordinate temper
among the troops. This, too, is true; men who become satisfied that
they are engaged in an enterprise dictated by the unconscionable
selfishness of the rich, and effectuated by a tyrannous disregard for
the will of those who must suffer and die, will be more prone to

117. See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377.
118. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free Speech Wars, 48 SMU L. REV. 203, 206 (1994).
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insubordination than those who have faith in the cause and
acquiesce in the means.119

His ruling was that even though the speech at issue was likely to prove very
harmful to the war effort in a variety of ways, it could not be made the basis
for criminal prosecution or the denial of access to the mails because it belongs
to a category of speech, the freedom of which is integral to creating the very
governmental authority that was being invoked to regulate it.120
Actually, Hand’s treatment of harm in Masses is not really antithetical to
Mill’s analysis in On Liberty. Mill never maintained as a matter of principle
that proof of harm is always sufficient to justify the restriction of individual
liberty. He states his famous Harm Principle to be:
[T]hat the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually
or collectively in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their
number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power
can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own
good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot
rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for
him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the
opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are
good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or
persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or
visiting him with any evil, in case he do otherwise. To justify that,
the conduct from which it is desired to deter him, must be calculated
to produce evil to some one else.121

Proof of harm is necessary in Mill’s scheme to justify the restriction of
individual liberty but not always sufficient to do so. And lest there be any
doubt about the importance to Mill of this distinction between the necessary
and the sufficient, in Chapter Two of On Liberty, entitled “Of the Liberty of
Thought and Discussion,” he never once addresses the question of when and
how speech can cause harm and what that means for his analysis.122 That is
because, as Mill specifies immediately preceding that chapter, he is arguing
for “absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects” including the
“liberty of expressing and publishing opinions.”123 He contends that
individuals must be permitted to circulate even concededly harmful
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
Id.
MILL, supra note 89, at 80.
Id. at 86–120.
Id. at 82.

742

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

opinions.124 Regarding thought and discussion, proving harm is not sufficient
to warrant restriction.
In Chapter Three of On Liberty, entitled “Of Individuality, as One of the
Elements of Well-Being,” Mill does indeed discuss harm with his wellknown example of a speaker telling “an excited mob assembled before the
house of a corn-dealer” that “corn-dealers are starvers of the poor.”125 That
speaker, says Mill, “may justly incur punishment,” even though the same
statement “ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the
press.”126 We might be tempted to interpret this passage to be making a
distinction that turns on the likelihood that harm will follow from the speech,
with speaker physical presence, crowd agitation, and victim proximity all
factors that increase the odds. If that were Mill’s point, then he would be
saying that a sufficient probability of sufficiently serious harm justifies the
punishment of speech that would otherwise be protected by his liberty theory.
Were that true, Mill would differ from Hand regarding the relevance of harm
to the regulation of speech.
I do not believe that to be the proper interpretation of Mill’s corn-dealer
example, however. First, the example appears in Chapter Three, where the
subject is individuality as an element of well-being, not Chapter Two, where
the subject is the liberty of thought and discussion.127 This suggests that with
the corn-dealer example Mill is exploring the relation of harm to the
regulation of a broader range of conduct than thought and discussion; he is
exploring the relation of harm to individuality more generally. And there can
be no doubt that with regard to liberty generally, excluding only the liberty
of thought and discussion, Mill does indeed maintain that proof of the
requisite harm will often justify limiting the liberty.128
Interpreting the excited mob version of the corn-dealer example to be not
about thought and discussion, but rather about another form of liberty, one
that can be restricted on the basis of harm, is supported by the way Mill
introduces the example: “No one pretends that actions should be as free as
opinions. On the contrary, even opinions lose their immunity, when the
circumstances in which they are expressed are such as to constitute their
expression a positive instigation to some mischievous act.”129

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 118–20.
Id. at 121.
Id.
Id. at 121–38, 86–120.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 121.
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From this passage we know that Mill believes actions are to be treated
differently from opinions, and that opinions which constitute positive
instigations are to be treated differently from other opinions. Whether we
label positive instigations “opinions” or “actions” is beside the point. In either
event, they “lose their immunity” from the “absolute protection” accorded by
Mill to “the liberty of thought and discussion,” the subject of Chapter Two,
where he never discusses harm because it is irrelevant.130 For all activities
other than thought and discussion—actions, positive instigations, trade,
competition to secure scarce positions—harm is indeed relevant. It is a
necessary and sometimes sufficient basis for restricting liberty, depending on
the balance of considerations that bear on collective and individual wellbeing.
The distinction Mill perceives between thought and discussion and all
other liberties is why he calls for different outcomes for his two corn-dealer
examples, treating stirring up an excited mob in person as a fundamentally
different activity from circulating the same message through the press.131 It is
also why Mill is at such pains in Chapter Two, the longest chapter of On
Liberty, to demonstrate the supreme importance of thought and discussion for
human flourishing and progress in understanding.132 That supreme
importance he does not claim for the full range of activities we commonly
call “speech,” “expression,” or “communication,” as his mob-inciting
example and treatment of positive instigation makes clear.133
Frederick Schauer, who has written perceptively about speech and harm
on numerous occasions and from different perspectives,134 confirms this
reading of Mill and explains why it matters to First Amendment doctrine:
If speech is understood as protected because it does not create harm
in the relevant sense, such an understanding may . . . foster the view
that only harmless speech is protected. And if speech is protected
only because and when it is harmless . . . it may be too easy to think
of harmlessness as a necessary condition for protection, and thus of
harmfulness as a sufficient condition for regulation. But if instead
we recognize, as I believe Mill did, that the liberty of thought and
discussion protects communications that may well be harmful in
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 121, 86–120.
See id. at 121.
See id. at 90–91.
For an in-depth discussion of Mill’s corn-dealer example see C.L. TEN, MILL ON
LIBERTY 133–36 (1980).
134. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Harm(s) and the First Amendment, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 81,
81–111; Frederick Schauer, The Phenomenology of Speech and Harm, 103 ETHICS 635, 635–53
(1993).
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any plausible sense of that term, and that it does so for reasons
extrinsic to the harm and anti-paternalism principles, what emerges
may be the robust free speech principle to which Mill plainly
subscribed, and in the service of which Mill and On Liberty remain
so important today.135

Just like Mill, Hand in Masses identifies a subset of human activity, speech
he calls “hostile criticism,” which plays such an indispensable role in
constituting political authority in a republic that it must be protected without
regard to what harm it might cause.136 In Areopagitica, his classic essay
against the licensing of printing, the seventeenth-century poet John Milton
makes a similar move regarding the speech he considers indispensable not
only to republican governance—Milton was a fierce critic of monarchy and
a devoted republican—but also to the discharge of duties owed to God.137
Madison maintains in the Virginia Report that the federal government has no
authority whatsoever to regulate seditious speech no matter the harm.138 The
Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan held that defamed public
officials can recover damages against their critics only by proving that the
harmful statements were published with knowledge of their falsity or reckless
disregard for the truth,139 which means that good faith criticism of
government is absolutely protected no matter how false and harmful it is.140
It should be noted that in none of these instances of ruling out the relevance
of harm is the exclusion comprehensive. Rather, harm is considered
insufficient to warrant regulation as an exceptional matter due to the
supervening importance or fundamentality of the subset of speech at issue.
Thus, Hand’s holding in Masses that certain speech cannot be prohibited
even when it is likely to cause specific, material harm does not mark him as
135. Frederick Schauer, On the Relation Between Chapters One and Two of John Stuart
Mill’s On Liberty, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 571, 592 (2011).
136. Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 539–40 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
137. See Vincent Blasi, A Reader’s Guide to John Milton’s Areopagitica, The Foundational
Essay of the First Amendment Tradition, 2017 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 296–98.
138. See MADISON, supra note 44, at 650.
139. 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).
140. Whether Holmes can be added to this list depends upon whether he understood his
danger test to provide that proof of the specified imminent type of harm is without exception
sufficient to justify the regulation of speech. His formulation of the danger test in seemingly
unqualified and comprehensive terms would appear to suggest that. On the other hand, when in
his Abrams dissent he opines that seditious libel cannot be a basis for regulating speech, that
“Congress certainly cannot forbid all effort to change the mind of the country,” and that a patriot
cannot be made to answer for criticizing war production priorities, Holmes might be implying
that even when those forms of speech threaten to cause imminent harm they are nevertheless
protected under the First Amendment. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627–28, 630
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP.
CT. REV. 1, 44. As always, definitive interpretations of Holmes are elusive.
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an isolated outlier; he has good company on this point. Nevertheless, it is
noteworthy that in determining the bounds of regulatory authority over
speech, so careful, balanced, and thoughtful a judge would deny the relevance
of a type of harm thought by millions, including himself, to be a true threat
to the nation, all in the name of honoring the commitment to republican
government.
***
These seven ideas demonstrate, I submit, how much more the Learned
Hand of the Masses opinion has to offer than his “interest or duty” test,
whatever its merits.

